Smart grid is a network of computers and power infrastructures that monitor and control energy usage by collecting data from the power grid. It can gather and distribute information about the behavior of all consumers in order to improve the efficiency, reliability, economics, safety, and sustainability of electricity services. In this paper, we propose a self-certi�ed P�C-based privacypreserving data aggregation scheme in smart grid to increase computation efficiency and achieve privacy protection of end users. To realize the anonymous aggregation of multidimensional data, we adopt the Chinese Remainder eorem and homomorphic property of Paillier cryptosystem to achieve it. Comparing our scheme with Lu et al. 's scheme, the result shows that our scheme has more advantages over Lu et al. 's scheme in terms of computational costs of the user, GW, and OA. A�er adopting batch veri�cation technique, the computational cost of GW is constant in our scheme, however, that of GW is linear with the number of the users in Lu et al. 's scheme. Furthermore, our scheme also supports the anonymity of the user's identity. It indicates that the local gateway GW does not know the real identity of the resident user such that the privacy of the user is better protected.
Introduction
Power electric systems in most countries have became old and inefficient. It might result in potential safety hazards. e Northeast blackout of 2003 was worth to be pondered. In this accident, about 200,000 people were affected, and 265 power plants were shut down during the outage. Investigations report found that the reason of blackout was due to human error and equipment failures. And this report indicated that this blackout could have been prevented and that immediate actions must be taken in both the United States and Canada to ensure that our electric system was more reliable. It puts forth a challenge for us. When a problem appears, how should we �nd it and solve it in time�
To overcome the problems caused by aging power grids, smart grid is developed. e earlier emerging smart grid technologies are electronic control, metering, and monitoring. e term smart grid has been used since at least 2005, when it appeared in [1�. ere are many smart grid de�nitions in the recent literature in different �avors. However, a common factor in these de�nitions is the application of digital processing and communications to the power grid, making data �ow and information management central to the smart grid.
e objective of smart grid is to provide end users or consumers with power in a more �exible, stable, and reliable manner. It makes end users know real-time electricity usage so as to actively adjust use of electricity. erefore, the smart grid is characterized by a two-way �ow of electricity and information between the provider and consumer of electric power. It achieves an automated, distributed energy delivery network and helps end users to balance power supply and demand by distributed computing and communications to deliver real-time information. Meanwhile, it also can detect and respond to weaknesses or failures in the power system in real time such that potential dangers are prevented.
Communication framework in smart grid is shown in Figure 1 , where power transmission and distribution systems are separated from the communication system. In the communication system in smart grid, smart meter is an important component in smart grid it can record consumption of electric energy in a time interval and communicate the information back to the utility for monitoring and billing purposes. However, current smart metering technologies which are applied in smart meters may result in privacy leak issues because they depend upon centralizing personal consumption information of the consumers at their smart meters. In 2009, e Netherlands enacted relevant laws to force to consider privacy issues in case of using smart meters [2] . Similarly, in the United States, NIST dictated that there privacy issues be taken into account in the design of smart grid communications [3] . ese privacy concerns may be addressed by adequately authenticating the smart meters. However, smart meter is a rather limited resources device with low memory and computational capacity. us, we cannot put too much burden on the constrained smart metering resources in the time of designing an authentication mechanism for smart grid communication.
Because communication in smart grid is based on the public data communication networks such as Internet. there exist a wide variety of malicious attacks, such as replay, eavesdropper, tamper of data, traffic analysis, tracing of the locations, and denial of service (DOS) attacks. us, before putting the application of smart grid into practice, the corresponding security and privacy issues must be resolved. For example, without the security and privacy guarantees, an adversary in smart grid can forge a fraudulent electricity usage data or breakdown information to mislead operation center. In terms of end users, privacy is a most concerned problem. It includes privacy of identity and privacy of data. Power-consuming data may reveal family income and physical activities. For example, power consumption of a household in a certain time is very low or zero; it implies that no one is at home. e user's identity is sensitive information. If it is leaked, it may result in potential unsafe factor. en home address and the number of apartments of the user are known. us, this privacy-sensitive information must be anonymous.
To achieve data privacy, encryption algorithm is used to ensure the safety of data. However, it may result in data expansion. How do we resist data expansion in the case of keeping data privacy? It brings a challenge to the smart meter with constraint resource. To solve this issue, we adopt homomorphic encryption technique [4] since it can achieve data aggregation under the condition that the data is encrypted. In other words, data can be aggregated in the ciphertext form. In 2005, Castelluccia et al. [5] adopted homomorphic encryption techniques to realize the aggregation of encrypted data without decryption at intermediate nodes. Subsequently, Westhoff et al. showed that the scheme [6] may result in an increased message overhead in per monitoring node since the ID list of the encrypting nodes must be transmitted when every node used different keys. us, a symmetric homomorphic encryption technique was applied to increase the efficiency in [6] . In [7] , Shi et al. was based on Castelluccia's scheme to put forth a privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme to preserve user privacy. Most of the previous works mainly focus on one-dimensional data. Recently, Lu et al. proposed a multidimensional data aggregation approach based on the homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem by using superincreasing sequence [8] . However, the computation overhead of local gateway is rather high. And the identity of end user is revealed in the communication between user and local gateway. According to [9] , the memory size of the local GW is up to 128 KB random access memory (RAM), 1 MB �ash memory, and 1�0 MHz CPU. us, the computational cost of the local gateway should be low as soon as possible.
Since the communication between the end user and the local gateway (GW) usually adopts wireless technology, it makes the end user suffer from the different attacks due to the open wireless network. Privacy protection of the end user's identity is particularly important. To guarantee end user's privacy, two important approaches are pseudonym mechanisms and group signature technique. e pseudonymity-based approach needs to periodically change a pseudonym. e group signature-based approach results in longer length of a signature than that of original signature, and computation cost of verifying a signature is very large. ese approaches are suitable for smart metering with limited resource.
Self-certi�ed public key cryptosystem was introduced by Marc [10] . In the self-certi�ed public key system, veri�cation and management of certi�cates are not required, and the key escrow problem can also be eliminated. e main idea is that certi�cate of public key is replaced by a witness, and the public key is implicitly embedded in it. Anyone who holds a witness along with an attributive identity can recover the corresponding public key to verify a signature. us, it leads to the reduction of communication, computation, and storage amount.
Our Contributions. To construct a scheme which is suitable for the device with low communication and computation resources in smart grid and achieve privacy protection of the end user's identity, in this paper, we propose a novel selfcerti�ed PKC privacy-preserving data aggregation (SP 2 DA) scheme. is scheme supports the aggregation of multidimensional power usage data by converting multidimensional data into a single-dimensional data. e main works of this paper are three-fold.
(1) To support aggregation of multidimensional data, we adopt the Chinese Remainder eorem to achieve the conversion of multidimensional data to singledimensional data.
(2) To support privacy of identity, the scheme adopts self-certi�ed public key cryptography to achieve it. It makes the scheme have the following advantages: short length of the signature and low computation.
(3) In the scheme, we realize that the computational cost of the local gateway is constant. It makes our scheme have more advantage over Lu et al. 's scheme [8] in terms of computational cost.
Communication System Model in Smart Grid
In the following, we give formal communication system model, security requirements, and our design goals.
Communication
Model. e communication model, it mainly consists of operation center and local area network (LAN). Operation center is responsible for dynamically balancing power supply. In general, a trusted operation authority (OA) manages it at operation center. All residential users in a special residential area (RA) and the local gateway (GW) form an LAN. Smart appliances and smart meters form a home area network (HAN). e communication between the user and the local gateway is achieved by the communication between smart meters in an HAN and the local gateway. Smart meters transmit the collected real-time electricity usage data to the local gateway. Aer aggregating all electricity usage data, the local gateway reports the result to operation authority. On receiving the reports from the local gateway in the residential area RA, the OA analyzes the received reports and sends the corresponding to feedback information to the local gateway in the residential area. en the local gateway broadcasts the feedback information to all users in the residential area. Finally, the users dynamically adjusts power consumption of smart appliance.
Security Requirements.
Security protection is essential in smart grid communication. It is an important condition before deploying smart grid. In the security model, the main aim is to ensure integrity and validity of the transmitted data and the privacy of user's identity.
Here, we assume that the OA is trustable and the local gateway GW is semitrustable, and the users U = (U 1 , U 2 , … , U ) in the residential area are honest. Because the connection of local gateway with the users adopts wireless techniques, there may exist an adversary to eavesdrop the residential users' communication to obtain message. In addition, we allow the adversary to launch active attacks on the residential users. To resist attacks of the adversary , we require that the communication in smart grid should satisfy the following security requirements.
(1) Authentication: it includes authentication of the user identity and message integrity. e user identity authentication means that the encrypted report is from a legal user. Message integrity authentication means that the transmitted data has not been altered. Any tempered data can be detected.
(2) Private: it also includes two points. e �rst point indicates that the data which is sent by the residential user is private since it is encrypted and the �nal data is aggregated. Only the operation authority OA can recover it. e other point indicates that the identity of the residential user is privacy for the local gateway. Any one cannot obtain the relevant information to the identity of the user from the transmitted data. Even the OA cannot also obtain any relevant information to the user from the aggregated data.
Design Goal.
Based on the previous communication model and security requirements, our design goal is to construct an efficient data aggregation protocol to achieve the following three objectives.
(1) Multidimensional data aggregation: in smart grid, the data which smart meters collect includes various types, such as the amount of the consumed power, and temperature and so on. e data in each dimension do not re�ect the use of the global situation; thus, we must take into account all the dimensions in order to reali�e �ner-grained control and optimi�ation. At the same time, smart meters of hundred and thousand residential users periodically send the multidimensional data. To efficiently deal with the huge communication cost and multidimensional data, we need to construct an efficient aggregation scheme to support multidata aggregation. (2) Global security. e smart meter-generated data should be authenticated to guarantee that they are from real sources and have not been tampered with during transmission. A tampered fraudulent data must be caught by the OA. (3) Privacy of the residential user: if a residential user behaves honestly and follows the protocol, its identity privacy should be guaranteed against attackers who can eavesdrop communication in smart grid. It means that the identities of the residential users were not revealed during the transmission of the data. However the OA cannot also obtain the identity information of the residential users from the transmitted real-time reports.
Preliminaries
In the following, we �rst review the bilinear pairing technique [11] and the Paillier Cryptosystem [9] as well as some mathematics problems. ey are the basis of the proposed SP 2 DA scheme. en some security assumptions which are the basis of security proof are given.
Bilinear Map and Paillier
Cryptosystem. In this subsection, we brie�y review the properties of the bilinear pairings. ) 2 , 2 ) = 1 + 2 , 1 2 ). And the security of the scheme is based on a discrete logarithm trapdoor modulo a large integer. In the following, we brie�y review it.
(1) Key generation phase: let = 1 1 be an RSA modulus where 1 , and 1 are two large prime numbers. Let be an element of order at least in the multiplicative group 2 . en the public key is pk = , ), and the corresponding private key is 1 , 1 ) (2) Encryption phase: let be an encrypted message and , and randomly choose to compute a ciphertext = ) = mod 2 .
(3) Decryption phase: given a ciphertext 2 , the corresponding plaintext = ) can be recovered by the private key 1 , 1 ). Please refer to [4] for the detailed process. 1 . e -wCDH problem is , )-hard, if there is no PPT algorithm that can solve the -wCDH problem in time at most with probability if
Security Assumption Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem (DBDH
e -wCDH problem is a new hard problem. e hardness of the problem is based on the difficulty of solving Collusion Attack Algorithm with traitors. 
e + 1 Exponent Problem (EP
e hardness of + 1 exponent problem is proved that it is polynomial time equal to the -wCDHP. 
Let the product = 1 2 ⋯ be de�ned. en a solution can be found as follows: For each , the integers and are coprime. Using the extended Euclidean algorithm we can �nd integers and such that = 1. Let = . en a solution is solved as follows:
�� �ur �n�n�m�u� Se����erti�e� Signature Scheme
In this section, we will give a novel self-certi�ed anonymous signature scheme which is the basis to achieve the anonymity of the residential user's identity in our SP 2 DA scheme. (8) and sends it to the user. en the user's private key is , ).
Anonymous Signing.
To produce a signature on message , the user with identity ID computes as follows.
(1) First, it randomly chooses a number to compute = ) and = 1 ID)) in order to conceal the witness of the user and his identity "ID".
(2) en randomly choose to compute
(3) Finally, the resultant anonymous signature on message is = , , ,).
Verifying.
Aer receiving a signature on message , a veri�er can execute the following process for each signature.
(1) Firstly, the veri�er parses into , , ,) and computes ℎ 2 = 2 ). 
4.6. Security Analysis. In the following, we show that the previously mentioned anonymous self-certi�ed signature scheme is secure against existential universal forgery under adaptive chosen message attack. 1 . In the following, we will give the detailed process. To answer the different queries from the adversary , we need to run ℬ to set up the system parameters. Let 1 , 2 , and be three cyclic groups with order . ∶ 1 × 2 → is a bilinear pairing map. ℬ sets 2 = ℎ as the generator of group 2 and MPK = ℎ as the master public key of the TTP, and randomly chooses ∈ to answer the following query.
(
Finally, ℬ returns ℎ 1 to the adversary and adds ID , , coin , ℎ 1 ) in the 1 -list. 2 -Oracle: when an adversary makes a query with string , ℬ outputs ℎ 2 2 ) if is in the list 2 which is initially empty. Otherwise, ℬ randomly chooses ∈ to set 2 ) and returns to the adversary; then it adds , ) to the 2 -list.
Corruption Oracle. When makes a corruption query with identity ID . If ID exists in the list which is initially empty, then ℬ outputs . Otherwise, ℬ randomly chooses ∈ to return to and adds ID , ) to the list .
WitReg Oracle.
issues a witness register query on input ID , pk , ), and ℬ outputs a ′ if ID is in the List which is initially empty. Otherwise, ℬ searches the private key in the list and in the list 1 , respectively, and returns the corresponding and . If coin 0, then ℬ computes the following witness:
where −1 . en, ℬ returns ′ to the adversary and adds ID , pk , , ′ ) in the list . If coin 1, then ℬ claims failure and aborts the simulation.
Anonymous Signing Oracle. When the adversary issues an anonymous signature query with , ID ). If ID exists in the lists and , then ℬ retrieves the corresponding and ′ and runs anonymous signing algorithm to produce a signature . Otherwise, ℬ executes as follows.
(1) ℬ �rstly retrieves ℎ 1 1 ID ) from the 1 -list. Note we assume that ID is queried for 1 -Oracle before other oracles were queried with ID .
(2) en, ℬ randomly picks ∈ to set ℎ 1 . 
where
2 )/ * and is an unknown number which is a blinded factor in the signing phase, namely, * 1 ID * ) .
Lemma 2. Our signature satis�es anonymity of signer�s i�en� tity.
Proof. Given a signature , , ,) on message , we cannot obtain any information of the signer. According to International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 7 the previous signature scheme, we know that ( 1 (ID)) are the relevant identity information of the signer. However, in our signature, and 1 (ID) are blinded by a random number . us, it is impossible to obtain any information of 1 (ID) and from ( ) of the signature (). Furthermore, is an unknown number in terms of the attacker; it cannot obtain the relation of ( 1 (ID)) and ( ). For in the signature , it does not reveal any information of the signer. For̂in the signature , it is expressed as the following form:
Although the private key of the signer is included, is randomized by two random numbers , and . us, has not also reveal any information of the signer's identity. According to the previous statement, any one cannot obtain the identity of the signer from a signature. erefore, our scheme achieves anonymity.
Our Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation Scheme
In the following, we will put forth a novel privacy-presrving aggregation scheme in smart by utilizing the proposed self-certi�ed anonymous signature scheme. ree types of entities, at is, the trusted operation authority (OA), a local gateway (GW), and the residential users (U), are involved in the scheme. It mainly consists of the following six phases: system initialization, GW register, user register, user report generation phase, privacy-preserving report aggregation phase, secure report reading, and response phase.
System
Initialization. e trusted operation authority (OA) set up the system as follows. 
. At the same time, we assume that the number of households in a residential area is at most and denotes the number of the different type of reported electricity usage data ( 1 … ) in smart grid, where is less than a constant . en, OA chooses coprime number ( 1 … ). Let ( 1 … ) ∑ 1 and and keeps the master keys ( 1 … ).
GW Registration.
When a local gateway (GW) of the residential area wants to register itself in the system, it randomly chooses a number as the private key and computes the corresponding public key 1 .
User Registration.
When a user U of residential area wants to join this system, the user U with real identity ID U must interactively communicate with OA by a con�dential channel by the following steps.
(1) e user U with identity ID �rst chooses a ∈ as his private key and computes the corresponding public key pk (4) Upon receiving (ID ′ ), the user �rst checks whether it is valid by the following equation:
If it is valid, then (ID ′ ) is the membership certi�cate of the user U , and it is added into the local database.
User Report Generation.
To periodically report electricity usage data of the residential user, each user U collects types of data ( 1 … ) by using the smart meters to execute the following steps.
(1) Randomly choose ∈ to compute the Paillier encryption
(2) en, it randomly chooses ∈ to compute ( ′ ) and ( 1 (ID )) in order to conceal the certi�cate ′ and his identity ID of the residential user U . 
where is a timestamp. (4) e resultant anonymous signature on message is = ( , , , ). (5) Finally, the encrypted electricity usage data || || || RA is reported to be the local gateway GW in the residential area RA. Note that the reported electricity usage data of the user U do not reveal any information of the user's identity.
�ri�ac���reser�ing Report �eri�cation and �ggregation of GW.
Aer receiving all electricity usage data || || || RA, = 1, 2, , from RA, the local gateway GW �rst checks whether belongs to a valid time slots, then it veri�es the validity of signature , ( = 1, 2, , ) by the following processes.
(1) Firstly, GW parses into ( , , , ) and computes
To increase efficiency of verifying signatures, the local gateway GW can make use of the following batch veri�cation:
where ℎ 2 = 2 ( || || || ), = 1, 2, , . We can �nd that the computation overhead in the batch veri�cation is appro�imate to that in the veri�cation of a signature. It only needs three pairing operations which are the most time-consuming operators.
Aer all previously mentioned verifying is valid, the gateway GW performs the following aggregation process to aggregate all electricity usage reports.
(1) It aggregates all encrypted data 1 , 2 , , into by computing
(2) en, it produces a BLS signature by his private key :
where denotes a timestamp. (3) Finally, send the aggregated data || RA || GW || || to the operation authority OA.
Secure Report Reading and Response.
Aer receiving an aggregated on message , the authority operation OA �rst checks whether the signature is valid by the equation ( , ) = ( , ( || RA || GW || )). en it decrypts the aggregated and encrypted electricity usage report by the Paillier decryption algorithm. Since
then the recovered message is
By the Chinese Remainder eorem, we can obtain the electricity usage data as follows: for = 1 to compute = mod = ∑ =1 1 mod . All derived electricity usage data ( 1 , 2 , , ) are the aggregation of residential user's electricity usage. Aer analyzing these data, the OA sends the feedback data ∈ to notify all residential users in residential area RA for adjusting the usage of electricity quantity. e process is done as follows.
(1) It randomly chooses ∈ to compute U = 2 and = MPK 0 .
(2) And it computes = ⋅ ( ( 1 , MPK) ).
(3) e resultant cipher is = (U, , ). In fact, it is a broadcast encryption from Step 1 to Step 3.
(4) en the OA produces a BLS signature = ( || RA || OA || ) where is a timestamp and feedback || to the local gateway GW in the residential area.
(5) Upon receiving the transmitted || , the GW can check whether it is valid by the following equation
If is holds, then it broadcasts to all residential users in the residential area RA. With the recovered electricity usage feedback report , the user U can control power use of household appliances from peak times to nonpeak times for saving electrical energy and rational utilization.
Security Analysis
In this section, we show that our scheme satis�es the previous security requirements.
(1) Global security requirement: obviously, this security requirement is satis�ed since each user's report is signed by our anonymous signature algorithm and the aggregated report is signed by BLS signature algorithm in our scheme. Furthermore, Lemma 1 shows that our anonymous signature is secure against adaptive chosen message attack, and the BLS short signature is provably secure under the CDH problem. us, we can efficiently identify the identity of the resident user, and it is impossible that exists a valid signature on a tempered data.
(2) Multidimensional data aggregation: in our SP 2 DA scheme, we adopt the Chinese Remainder eorem and Paillier Cryptosystem. It can achieve multidimensional data aggregation in the ciphertext form. For a user's transmitted data ( , … , , they are represented as (27) + ⋯ + can be considered as singledimensional data to process. When receiving data ( , … , , the local gateway GW can aggregate these data as
Since for to , the relation ∑ < holds, thus, the OA can obtain ∑ by computing ∑ + ⋯ + ∑ mod according to the Chinese Remainder eorem. erefore, our scheme can achieve multidimensional data aggregation.
(3) Privacy of the residential user: Because the transmitted report of the residential user is signed by adopting our anonymous signing algorithm in our SP 2 DA scheme, each residential user's identity is protected. Furthermore, the transmitted report is encrypted by Paillier Encryption algorithm, it means even if the attacker eavesdrops the transmitted report, it still cannot obtain the individual user's data. For a feedback message of the OA, OA sends the ciphertext (U, , of this feedback message to all residential users in residential area RA by adopting broadcast encryption. Only the residential user in the RA can recover the corresponding feedback message . In the following security proof, we will show that the con�dentiality of the transmitted feedback message can be achieved.
Lemma 3. e broadcast encryption scheme in our SP
2 A scheme is semantic secure against chosen-plaintext attack under the DBDH problem.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an adversary that can break the broadcast encryption in SP 2 DA scheme; then we can construct an algorithm ℬ that can solve the DBDH problem with advantage by using as a subroutine.
Let ℬ be given a DBDH problem instance
